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Abstract 
 
This paper studies a Stated Preference (SP) experiment on the choice of type of (Rail) season card, 
conducted among current Dutch Railways season cardholders. They were asked to choose from the 
following three alternatives: (1) an unrestricted season card, (2) a cheaper season card with peak travel 
and travel frequency restrictions, and (3) not buying a season card. Multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit 
and mixed logit models are used to analyse their choices. It is found that MNL underestimates the price 
sensitivities (as measured by the price elasticities) of the respondents and overestimates their Willingness-
to-Pay (WTP) for reductions in the restrictions. The mixed logit estimation shows that there are 
(unobserved) differences in the marginal utilities of the price of the card (response heterogeneity), and the 
utility of owning a season card (preference heterogeneity). In the Netherlands a large share of commuters 
and business travellers receive travel cost compensation from their employer.  However, empirical studies 
often do not control for the effect of travel cost compensation. We find, as expected, that travel cost 
compensation has a large impact on the price sensitivities and choices of the respondents. 
 
Keywords: SP experiment; Rail season card; Travel cost compensation; Public transport demand. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Season cards are often used in public transport systems as one of the ticket types.  Of 
the total passenger kilometres of the Dutch Railways (NS) in 2005, about 32% was by 
season cardholders. Furthermore, season cardholders are most likely relatively frequent 
train users, as this group predominantly consists of commuters (Steer Davies Gleave, 
2006a). Hence, this group of travellers is very important in public transport. With a 
season card a person can travel free of extra charge by public transport and for this the 
person pays a certain amount per period. 
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However, the empirical study of the preferences of season cardholders has been very 
limited. This paper studies a Stated Preference (SP) experiment, performed on current 
Dutch Railways season cardholders, on the choice of rail season card. The SP 
experiment was designed and carried out by Steer Davies Gleave (2007). In the 
experiment, the respondents chose between three alternatives: (1) a conventional 
unrestricted season card, which is the same as their current one but more expensive, (2) 
a (hypothetical) card which is cheaper than their current card, but has restrictions on 
allowed travel frequency and travel during the rush hour, and (3) the no card alternative 
(i.e. not buying a season card). 
An interesting aspect of the used survey is that it contains information on the 
proportion of the card’s price that is paid by the respondent. This makes it possible to 
control for the effect of travel cost compensation by third parties. This is important, as a 
large share of the Dutch travellers get their travel costs (partly) compensated by third a 
party (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). Empirical studies of price sensitivities of travellers 
often do not control for such travel cost compensation, despite the fact that it is often 
named as a reason for why (absolute) transport demand elasticities are so low.  
Table 1 shows that 58% of the respondents get the price of the season card fully 
compensated, whereas only 9% get nothing compensated. The remainder of the 
respondents is partly compensated. It seems unlikely that a respondent that is currently 
fully compensated would be just as price sensitive as a comparable respondent who is 
not compensated. The used survey enables us to control for such differences. 
Table 1: Distribution of the proportion of the price of the season card respondents pay of themselves. 
Proportion of the price paid by the respondent Number of respondents Percentage of the 
respondents 
0% 328 57.7% 
1%-25% 76 13.4% 
26%-50% 56 9.9% 
51%-75% 35 6.2% 
75%-99% 21 3.7% 
100% 52 9.2% 
 
Multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit and mixed logit estimations are used to study 
the responses in the SP experiment. The two card alternatives both entail owning a card 
and hence both produce the utility of owning a season card. It is found that the value of 
this shared utility component differs substantially over the respondents. In MNL 
estimations the alternative specific constants (ASC’s) measure (after controlling for the 
effect of the other variables) the average utility of owning a restricted or unrestricted 
card. Deviations from this average remain in the unobserved elements. The unobserved 
utilities of the two card alternatives are thus most likely related, as both contain the 
individual utility of owning a season card, and this violates the IID assumption of MNL. 
Nested logit and mixed logit estimations can control for this.  
From the estimations, elasticities to changes in the price and Willingness-to-Pay for 
changes in the card’s restrictions are calculated. Large and interesting differences are 
found between the elasticities and WTP’s from the MNL, the nested logit and the mixed 
logit estimations.   
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It is common to find in the empirical literature that MNL gives incorrect estimates, 
when unobserved heterogeneity is present. For instance, Bhat (1998) notes that if there 
is heterogeneity in the preferences for the alternatives (i.e. heterogeneous ASC’s) or 
response heterogeneity (i.e. heterogeneous marginal utilities), then ignoring this could 
lead to biased parameter estimates and choice probabilities. He found that for his dataset 
with MNL the WTP’s were larger and the elasticities lower than with mixed logit. 
Hence, the conclusion was that MNL underestimated the price sensitivity.  
Bhat (2000a) found that MNL severely underestimates the WTP’s for out-of- and in-
vehicle travel time and overestimates the “cost” elasticities, compared with his mixed 
logit which controlled for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Train (1998) found 
for his data that the compensating variations for the attributes are slightly to 
substantially larger with mixed logit than with MNL. He also found that the 
compensating variations from his mixed logit with correlated parameters are smaller 
than those found by MNL and mixed logit. He concludes that there probably is no 
general conclusion whether MNL gives good estimates for the Willingness-to-Pay and 
that the performance of MNL will be different for each dataset. 
This compares with the results of a theoretical study of Horowitz (1980), who used 
datasets created by Monte Carlo simulation. He found that ignoring heterogeneous 
marginal utilities causes no bias in ratio of coefficients (i.e. WTP’s) from MNL 
estimations. He did find, however, that ignoring heterogeneity causes the choice 
probabilities to be biased. He also found that correlated unobserved elements (i.e. a 
nested structure) cause the probabilities to be biased.  
With MNL and nested logit it is only possible to control for observed heterogeneity. 
In this respect, it is important that the used survey has data on travel cost compensation, 
which we expect to have a substantial effect on the marginal utility of price.  
This paper studies whether the WTP’s and elasticities from MNL are also biased for 
our data, as was found in other empirical studies. It also studies what the effect is of 
travel cost compensation on the price sensitivity and choice probabilities of the 
respondents.   
The next section discusses the SP experiment. Section 3 discusses the different 
methods we use. Thereafter, section 4 describes the season card utility functions. 
Section 5 analyses the MNL estimations. Section 6 discusses the nested logit estimation. 
Section 7 discusses the mixed logit estimation and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Discussion of the season card stated preference experiment 
 
This section discusses the used Stated Preference (SP) exercise. This paper uses the 
dataset from an SP season card experiment, in which 626 current Dutch Railways (NS) 
season cardholders participated. This NS tariff structure review stated preference survey 
was designed and carried out by Steer Davies Gleave (2007).  
The season card SP experiment was part of a larger survey, which also studied the 
preferences of discount card holders and single ticket travellers. The experiments were 
conducted among on members of the NS internet panel. Of the 13000 invitations send 
out for the entire survey, a total of 4571 respondents completed their SP experiment(s) 
and questionnaires, resulting in a response rate of 35%. The survey was carried out in 
June and July 2006 (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006a). Note that the experiment does not 
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cover people who might become cardholders in the future. Hence, the results of this 
paper are not representative for the entire population of potential cardholders.  
In the experiment, the respondents were asked to choose between three alternatives: 
(1) an unrestricted season card, which is the same as their current season card but more 
expensive, (2) a cheaper card, with travel frequency and rush hour travel restrictions and 
(3) no card (i.e. do not buy a season card).  The experiment was based on an orthogonal, 
fractional factorial design and there was no correlation between any of the design 
variables. The experiment had 32 different choice cards. To limit the risk of loss of 
concentration of the respondents, each respondent was shown only eight cards, each of 
which was randomly selected from the total of 32 (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). 
Background questions were asked on for instance age, trip purpose and in-vehicle 
travel time of their most frequent trip, the price of their current card, and the proportion 
of the price of their season card that they pay themselves. The price of the current 
season card was used as a benchmark in the creation of the choice cards. Table 2 gives a 
description of the SP experiment, and Figure A.1 in the appendix gives an example 
choice card. Note that the order in which the alternatives were presented was randomly 
determined for each choice card. 
Table 2: Description of the season card choice experiment 
Note: source Steer Davies Gleave (2006b) 
 
There are four levels for the price difference design variable (10%, 20%, 30% and 
40% of the current price). The price difference was divided over an increase, relative to 
the current price, for the unrestricted card and a lowering for the restricted card. This 
so called “split” of the price difference was randomly generated. The design variable 
was, hence, the price difference between the two alternatives as a percentage of the 
current price (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). For example, with a 30% price difference 
and a 2:1 split, the unrestricted card is 20% more expensive than the current card and 
the restricted card 10% cheaper. 
The restricted season card was invalid during the peak, the start and end of which 
were varied independently. A holder of this card thus would have to travel outside the 
restricted periods, or buy a single train ticket to travel during the restricted period or 
travel by a different mode. The start and end points of the AM and PM restricted 
periods varied independently around the references times of 8:00 and 17:00. Each of the 
four travel moment restriction variables has four levels, 0, 30, 60 and 90 minutes. In 
half of the choice cards, the restricted card had the limitation of maximum 5 days 
travelling per week with the card. In the analysis this experiment, the prices of the 
yearly season cards were divided by twelve, to obtain monthly prices (Steer Davies 
Gleave, 2006b). The average monthly price of the current season card of the 
respondents was 170 euros. 
Alternatives Design variables Levels of the design variables 
1 Unrestricted season 
   card 
Price difference between the 
two types of season card’s 
10%, 20%, 30% and 40% 
of the current price 
2 Restricted season card Travel moment restrictions 0 min, 30 min, 60 min and 90 min from 8:00 or 17:00 
3 No card Maximum 5 days of travel per week 
Yes a maximum or no maximum 
of 5 days per week 
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The respondents were asked, for the outward and return trip, if they could arrive 
earlier and later, and if so by how much. The possible answers are not earlier (later), 
max 30 minutes, max one hour, and more than an hour earlier  (later). 
Figure 1 shows how often the three alternatives were chosen. It is clearly visible that 
the unrestricted card is the most popular. 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Unresticted season card Restricted season card No card
 
Figure 1: Choice frequency of the alternatives in the SP experiment. 
 
 
3. Estimation methodology 
 
This study uses random utility maximization models. The utility function (Uiqt) for 
alternative i of respondent q in choice situation t is stated in (1). It has two parts, a 
deterministic part (Viqt) and an additive random part (εit), which is unknown to the 
observer. MNL bases its calculations on the assumption that the unobserved elements 
are independently and identically distributed (IID) and have the distribution form 
Extreme Value Type 1 (EV1) (Koppelman and Sethi, 2000). 
The deterministic utility function of alternative i, for individual q in choice situation t, 
is represented by (2). It is determined by a vector of k attributes (xiqt) and their 
parameters (vector βi). With MNL only one fixed parameter for each variable can be 
estimated. It is possible that the individual respondent (q) faces several choice situations 
(indicated by subscript t). The T in superscript indicates that the vector is transposed. 
Note that βiT xiqt may also contain an alternative specific constant (ASCi). Individual 
characteristics (zq) and their vector of parameters (δi) can be added to Viqt. These 
variables are added to control for observed heterogeneous preferences for the 
alternatives, by differentiating the ASC’s over observed characteristics. Matrix Ψi gives 
the effect of the characteristics on the marginal utilities of the attributes. This, hence, 
enables a control for observed heterogeneous responses to the attributes. 
 
 iq t
 
U =  V +  iq t iq t ε  (1) 
V = (  + )  + iqt i i iq qt i iqz x zβ δΨ T T  (2) 
(1 )P iqt ikqtiqt ikq iqt ikqtxikqt
ikqt iqt
P x
E P x
x P
β∂= = −
∂
 (3) 
 
The direct micro (choice situation specific) elasticity for Multinomial Logit (MNL) is 
given by (3). It can be interpreted as the elasticity of the probability that individual q, in 
choice situation t, chooses alternative i, with respect to a change in the kth attribute. 
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This formula gives a different elasticity for each respondent and in each choice 
situation. To aggregate the micro elasticities we calculate the choice probability 
weighted average of all the micro elasticities of all respondents and the multiple choice 
situations they face. An alternative would be to calculate the normal average or to use 
the average (sample) values of the variables and marginal utilities. Louviere, Hensher 
and Swait (2000) warn against the usage of the using sample averages and calculating 
the unweighted average. Logit estimations are non-linear, thus the estimated logit 
function need not to pass through the point defined by the sample averages. The 
unweighted average ignores that situations (and persons) with a higher choice 
probability have a larger influence on total demand. 
Nested logit is a popular alternative for MNL. It to some extent relaxes the 
assumption of independently distributed unobserved elements. Nested logit allows for 
correlation between the utilities of alternatives in predefined “nests”. This correlation 
comes from unobserved factors that influence the utility of the alternatives in the nest in 
the same manner. In our study there are three alternatives, (1) an unrestricted card, (2) a 
cheaper card with restrictions, and (3) do not buy a season card (i.e. the no card 
alternative). It seems likely that the two alternatives that entail owning a card have some 
unobserved similarities, and are hence in the “season card” nest. The (hypothetical) 
restricted card is by design the unrestricted card with a lower price and some validity 
restrictions added. This implies a nest tree with two levels. The scale parameters of the 
alternative level (µi) are normalised to one. Thus this study uses the version of nested 
logit with the scale parameters of the alternative level normalised to one and hence only 
the nest level scale parameters estimated.  
Under the said normalisation, the deterministic utility of nest l is Vlqt= λl*IVlqt. The 
IVlqt is the “Inclusive Value” variable and is equal to the natural logarithm of the sum of 
the exponentials of the deterministic utilities of all alternatives in the nest (i.e. it is the 
log sum). The λl is the scale parameter for the branch level. The correlation of the utility 
functions of two nested alternatives is corr(Vj-Vi)=1-(λl)2. The closer λl is to one, the 
lower the correlation. If the parameter is not significantly lower than one, the model can 
be estimated by MNL (Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000). The (choice situation 
specific) micro elasticity for nested logit, when the µi‘s are normalized and there are two 
levels, is following Greene (2002) given by  
 
λ * ( | )(1 ( )) (1 ( | )) .iqt
ikqt
P
l ikq qt qt ikqt ikq qt ikqtXE P i l P l x P i l xβ β= − + −  (4) 
 
The Pqt(i|l) is the conditional choice probability of alternative i, conditional on its nest 
l being chosen. The Pqt(l) is the choice probability of nest l. The total (unconditional) 
choice probability (Pqt(i)) is the product of the conditional choice probability of i and 
the choice probability of its nest (Greene, 2002). 
MNL and nested logit both suffer from their respective IID assumptions and that they 
can only control for observed heterogeneity. Mixed logit can allow non-IID unobserved 
elements and can control for unobserved heterogeneity (Bhat, 2000b).  
The utility function for mixed logit is given by (5). The xiqt is a vector of attributes 
and βiq a vector of individual parameters, which is the same for respondent q over all 
choice situations. The individual marginal utility of attribute k is determined by (6). The 
βik is the fixed parameter and ηiqk is the random individual component of the parameter. 
We thus used a panel version of mixed logit. Note that Revelt and Train (1998) 
developed the panel formulation of mixed logit. The panel version of mixed logit 
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controls for the fact that we use an experiment with repeated choices and thus that the 
unobserved elements will (most likely) be similar for a respondent over the choice 
situations. In contrast, the non-panel version would assume that the unobserved random 
elements of the marginal utility of price will be completely different for a respondent 
from one choice situation to the next. 
 
Uiqt= β iqT xiqt + εiqt  (5) 
sd_ik=  + *iqk ik ik q iqkv z
Tβ β β η+  (6) 
 
The distribution form of the random part has to be predefined. With mixed logit it is 
also possible to take into account systematic differences in the parameters. For this, a 
vector of background variables (zq) is multiplied by vector υik, which determines the 
effect of the background variables on the parameter. The ASC is part of β iqT xiqt, hence it 
is possible to differentiate the ASC’s over individuals (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 
2005). 
We use two types of distribution shapes of the random component in this paper. The 
first is the triangular distribution and the second the lognormal. The lognormal 
distribution has the useful property that the marginal utilities are constrained to have the 
same sign for all respondents. This is useful for variables for which it is implausible to 
have negative or positive effects on utility1.  
The mixed logit choice probability formula of equation (7) has an open-form integral 
in it. Consequently, this probability can generally not be calculated directly and has to 
be approximated by simulation (Train, 2003). Values for the random elements (the 
ηiqk’s) are drawn and then using the values of the variables and the predefined 
distributions of the random elements, the conditional probabilities (Liqt) are calculated. 
These probabilities are conditional on the draws of the random elements and hence the 
simulated outcome is different for each draw. Therefore, the process is repeated for 
many draws for each choice situation and the average probabilities are used as 
approximations of the choice probabilities. 
 
( )exp ( ) d L ( ) d
exp( )iq iq
iqt
iqt iq iq iqt iq iq
jqtj
V
P f f
Vβ β
η η η η= =
  
 
  (7) 
 
An important question is what number of repetitions results in a reasonably accurate 
and stable simulated outcome. The simulation for mixed logit traditionally uses pseudo-
random draws. This method has the disadvantage that it requires a very large number of 
repetitions to get stable results (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 2005). Bhat (2000b) 
proposes the use of Halton draws. Halton sequences are generated from number theory 
and are more uniformly spread than the pseudo-random draws. This causes the 
estimation to be stable with fewer repetitions. For this reason, we only used Halton 
draws. We used LIMDEP/NLOGIT to estimate the models in this paper, using 
maximum (simulated) likelihood and for our final mixed logit estimation we used 2500 
Halton draws.  
                                                 
1
 It is not directly possible to estimate negative coefficients with this distribution. However, this is easily 
be solved by multiplying the variable, which should have a negative marginal utility, by minus one. 
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The choice situation specific (micro) elasticity with mixed logit is given by equation 
(8). This elasticity has two parts that are in open-form integrals. One part gives the 
derivative of the probability to the independent variable and the second gives the choice 
probability (Train, 2003). To approximate these we perform a second simulation using 
100 Halton draws. Each draw results in a different derivative and probability for the 
same choice situation for the same person. The average derivatives and probabilities are 
then used as approximations and used to calculate the choice situation specific (micro) 
elasticities. These are then, following Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000), aggregated 
by calculating the choice probability weighted average.  
The Halton draws used the primes 2 and 3. The simulation with a 100 draws was very 
stable. When we ran the same code using different sets of primes the aggregate 
elasticities only differed from each other by a few thousands. 
 
L (1 L ) ( ) d
L ( ) diq
iq
P iqt ikqt ikqtiqt
iqt iqt ikq iq iqxikqt ikqt iqt iqt iq iq
P x x
E f
x P fβ β
β η η
η η
  ∂
  
= = −
  
  ∂
  
  
  
 
 
  (8) 
 
 
4. Utility functions for the season cardholders 
 
This section describes the used deterministic utility function (Viqt) for each alternative 
(i=1,2,3) for respondent q in choice situation t. In the first two alternatives, the 
respondent continues to own a season card. Accordingly, the utility functions of these 
two contain the benefit of owning a card. The price sensitivity, as measured by the 
parameter of the price attribute, is assumed to be the same for both alternatives. To 
control for differences in the proportion of the price that respondents pay themselves, 
the price variable is interacted with the proportion paid by the respondent and the 
proportion paid by others variables, to obtain two price attributes.  
The coefficient for “price paid by a third party” will be zero if the respondent does 
not care about the money spend by the third party. However, it could for example be the 
case that an employee fears that increases in the amount paid by the employer will 
induce him to make the compensation policy less generous, or that she fears a negative 
relation between the travel compensation and the wage. Than in those cases the 
coefficient will be negative.  
In (9a-c), the βp2q is the coefficient of “price*proportion paid” (representing “own” 
expenses) and βp3q is the coefficient of the other interacted price variable (representing 
the amount spend by the third party). It is expected that βp3q is negative, though smaller 
in absolute sense than βp2q. If the utility of individual q of owning a card is subtracted 
from each alternative, this results in the following utility functions: 
 
V(1=unrestricted card)qt= βp2q*price1qt*proportion paidq+βp3q*price1qt(1-proportion paidq), (9a) 
V(2=restricted card)qt    = βp2q*price2qt*proportion paidq+βp3q*price2qt(1-proportion paidq) 
                          
5
 
1
 * restriction + ASC_2 ,n nqt qγ+∑  (9b) 
V(3=no card)
 qt              =  - β1q* owning a cardq =ASC_3q. (9c) 
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In (9a-c), the constant of the no card alternative (ASC_3q) is defined as minus the 
utility of owning a card, and therefore measures the utility of owning a card 
(irrespective of whether or not it is restricted). The five “restriction variables” are added 
to the restricted card’s utility function. There are two variables measuring the beginning 
and end of the restrictions in the morning, two that do the same for the afternoon, and 
one dummy variable for if the restricted card has a maximum of five days per week of 
free of extra charge of travelling. The last restriction is a travel frequency restriction, 
whereas the earlier four are travel moment restrictions. These four variables are 
measured in minutes from some reference point.  
These reference points can be measured in two ways. With the first method the 
reference points are 8:00 in the morning and 17:00 for the afternoon. If the two 
variables are zero there is no travel restriction. This measurement gives the travel 
moment restrictions as they were shown in the choice cards to the respondents.  
The second type follows the specification proposed by Steer Davies Gleave (2006b), 
and is centred around the times the respondent reported currently to start and finish her 
(most frequent) round trip. Suppose that the respondent gets on the train at 8:00 AM for 
the outbound journey, at 18:30 for the return journey and her trip takes 30 minutes both 
ways. Further, suppose that the restricted card is invalid between 7:00-8:30 and 16:00-
18:00. Then, if the respondent wants to travel with the restricted card, she should 
displace her outbound travel moment to 60 minutes earlier or to 30 minutes later. 
Accordingly, the displacement times earlier and later are 60 and 30 minutes. The start of 
the return journey does not need alteration and thus the values for displacement times 
for the return trip are zero. The displacement times earlier for the outbound and return 
trip are centred around the current arrival times, whereas the displacement times later 
are centred around the current departure times. 
As the restrictions are defined in minutes before and after a desired moment, they 
should give disutility and hence their parameters are hypothesized to be negative. There 
might also be some constant disutility of the restricted option. For instance, because the 
restricted card limits travel flexibility. This fixed disutility is measured by the ASC_2 
of the restricted card.  
The parameters of the two proportion paid interacted price variables can combined to 
form the total marginal utility of price by calculating 
 
 2 3 * proportion paid  + (1-proportion paid )price q p q q p q qβ β β= .    
 
It is possible to control further for different responses to changes in the attributes, by 
differentiating the βp2q and βp3q parameters. It seems likely that the coefficients for the 
price variables also differ over the respondents for unobserved reasons. It is also 
plausible that people with inflexible travel moments receive more disutility from the 
travel moment restrictions. The utility of owning a card differs over the respondents and 
it is likely that part of this remains unobserved. Examples of unobserved differences are 
accessibility of the origin train station, accessibility of the final destination from the 
destination rail station and relative preference for rail travel. 
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5. MNL estimations 
 
Of the 626 respondents who completed the season card experiment, 568 respondents 
are actually used in this study. The other 58 respondent were filtered out because they 
reported that their most frequent trip made by the season card was for other purposes 
than commuting, going to school or a business trip. The focus in this study is on these 
three groups of “scheduled” travellers. Eight choice cards were shown to each 
respondent, hence there are 4544 observations. 
As explained the four travel moment restriction variables are formulated, following 
the specification of Steer Davies Gleave (2006b), in the “displacement time” format2. 
The advantage of the displacement time variables is that they make the effect of the 
restrictions more person specific, so that their value is more likely to reflect the 
concerns of the individual. Note that these displacement time variables cannot be 
directly used to measure schedule delay valuation. Even with the restricted card, 
respondents can travel in the restricted period by single standard tickets or by car. 
Table 3 shows the basic MNL estimation. This model does not yet control for the 
proportion of the price that respondents pay themselves. Coefficients for the three 
alternatives are depicted in separate columns. All six coefficients of the attributes are of 
the expected sign, and significant at the one percent level. 
Among the displacement time attributes, the later restriction of the outbound trip 
moment gives more disutility than the displacement time earlier of the outbound trip. In 
contrast, for the return trip the displacement time earlier gives more disutility than later. 
This probably reflects the fact that the scheduling constraints at the destination (e.g. 
work) are more tight than at the origin (e.g. at home). 
Both ASC’s are significantly negative. The control variables make the ASC’s group 
specific and hence control for heterogeneous preferences. The inflexible travel moment 
variable is a count variable for how often out of four questions the respondent answered 
that she could not change her travel moments of the most frequent trip. Thus, if she 
could start the outbound trip later or earlier, and if she could leave earlier or later for the 
return trip. The higher the value of this variable, the more inflexible she is and the less 
attractive the restricted card. This variable has a very significant negative effect on the 
utility of the restricted card. 
Dummies reflecting the journey length (in-vehicle travel time of the most frequent 
trip) are added to all MNL estimations. Note that these are not attributes, but 
background variables. The journey lengths were reported in minutes. The variable is 
represented by five dummies; 15 minutes or less, 16 to 30 minutes, 31 to 45 minutes, 46 
to 90 minutes and more than 90. The respondents with 15 minutes or less are the 
reference group. An advantage of using dummies is that it enables the study of non-
linear effects. Respondents with journeys that are shorter than 16 minutes are more 
likely to choose the no card alternative. Presumably, for these shorter trips there is more 
competition from more alternative modes of transport. The effect on the restricted card 
alternative is more unclear. Only the 46 to 90 minutes dummy has a significant effect. 
This indicates that this group has more difficulty coping with the restrictions. 
                                                 
2
 In an estimation not shown in this paper, the final MNL model was re-estimated using the absolute 
travel moment restrictions (i.e. relative to absolute clock times) instead of the displacement time 
variables. The replacement had very little effect on the coefficients of the other attributes. The only 
substantial effect was of the ASC of the restricted card alternative. 
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The car dummy is 1 if the household of the respondent owns one or more cars. It has a 
slightly significant effect in the restricted card’s utility function. Persons with a car 
available are more willing to accept the restrictions. Car availability does not affect the 
constant of the third no card alternative. This indicates that car availability does not 
alter the utility of owning a season card, though it does alter the possibility of coping 
(once in a while) with the restrictions. Finally, a categorical variable on the weekly 
frequency of the most often made trip is added. This variable controls for the fact that 
persons who travel more, should receive different utilities from the alternatives. The 
surprising result is that the variable has no effect in the MNL estimations, whereas we 
expected that a season card is more valuable for travellers with higher trip frequencies. 
Table 3: Estimation of the season card choice with one price variable. 
 Season Card (1) Card with restrictions (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
   
Price (generic) -0.0026*** -6.14 -0.0026*** -6.14  
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier   -0.0085
***
 -3.70   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.31   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0119*** -6.35   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0097*** -4.60   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2573*** -2.75   
Control variables 
   
Inflexible travel moment   -0.1311*** -3.91   
Journey time in 
minutes dummies: 15 min or less   Reference Group Reference Group 
 16 to 30 min   0.1250 0.84 -0.7405*** -4.62 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1426 -0.87 -0.8059*** -4.55 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3425** -1.96 -0.6717*** -3.69 
 More than 91 min   -0.1398 -0.85 -0.8373*** -4.50 
Car in household   0.1853* 1.76 -0.0221*** -0.20 
Frequency trip   0.0199 0.24 -0.0862 -0.94 
ASC   -0.9081*** -4.36 -2.7363*** -11.03 
Respondents   568        Choice cards per respondent   8        log-likelihood   -2840.65         Adjusted Rho2   0.5731 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
The Adjusted Rho2 is calculated as (LL(estimation)-number of parameters) / LL(0), where LL(0) is the 
log-likelihood for an estimation with all parameters fixed at zero. 
 
Table A.1 in the appendix shows the estimation following the specification of (9a-c), 
with two price interacted with proportion paid by the respondent variables. The log-
likelihood for this estimation is much higher than for the estimation of Table 3. 
Respondents react much stronger to prices if they pay a higher proportion themselves. 
There is a marked difference in the price sensitivities of those who pay little themselves 
and those who pay a large share. The coefficient of Price*proportion paid is much 
larger in absolute sense than the coefficient of Price*proportion paid by others. 
However, the effect of Price*proportion paid by others is also significantly negative. 
Travel cost compensation has therefore the expected large effect on the price 
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sensitivities. However, even respondents who currently are fully compensated are not 
completely price insensitive. Whether this is because they do care about what third part 
pays, or because they fear changes in the compensation policy following price increases, 
is unknown. In any case, these results suggest that cost compensation has a large effect 
on the decision of purchasing a season card. 
Control dummies on occupation and purpose of the most frequent trip have no effect 
in the estimations. Interacting the attributes with the occupation, trip length, and 
purpose of trips variables does not alter the results. Especially interesting is that car 
ownership of the respondent’s household does not alter the price sensitivity. We 
expected that with an easily available alternative mode one would expect that the 
respondent would be more price sensitive.  
The estimation of Table A.2 tests whether there is a different valuation of the season 
card over the age groups. The 30 to 39 and 50 to 59 year olds value the season card 
significantly less than the 60 and older group. For the 18 and younger, 20 to 29 and the 
40 tot 49 no effect is found.  Note that the coefficients for the dummies for the age 
categories are not significantly different from each other. 
It seems possible that the effects of the price and travel restrictions variables differ 
with the gender of the respondent. The results of the final MNL specification are shown 
in Table 4. It interacts the gender dummy (one for women) with price*proportion paid 
and adds gender dummies to the utility functions. The price*(proportion paid)*gender 
interaction variable has a significant positive effect on utility. This indicates that women 
are less price sensitive than men. Conversely, the gender dummies alone have no direct 
effect. This predicts that there is no difference in the valuation of the alternatives over 
gender. There is again a clear difference in the price sensitivities of those who pay little 
themselves and those who pay a large share of the price of the season card. 
Interacting the restriction attributes with background variables does not lead to 
statistical improvements. It was expected that respondents with more restricted travel 
moments value travel moment restrictions more. This was tested by interacting the 
displacement time variables with their respective answers on the question on how much 
the travel moment could be changed. An example should make this arrangement clearer. 
The displacement outbound trip later variable was interacted with the answer to the 
question how much the respondent could start her most frequent outbound trip later. 
However, we found that the interacted displacement time variables have no effect on the 
utility of the restricted card. Similarly, car ownership, age, purpose of the trip and 
occupation do not differentiate the marginal utilities of the attributes. Interacting the 
gender dummy with the other attributes also does not improve matters.  
The effect of proportion paid on the price sensitivity is very large. However, 
interpreting the resulting coefficients is difficult. When the price is raised, it is uncertain 
how much of this raise is paid by the individual and how much by the third party. The 
proportion paid could remain constant. The respondent could have to pay the entire 
increase herself. It is also possible that following the increase the respondent will 
convince the third party to increase the share that it pays. Conversely, the third party 
could make its compensation policy less generous. In the discussion of the estimations, 
it is assumed that the proportion paid is constant, that it is just a background variable.  
The total marginal utility of the price attribute is given by 
 
 2 q 3(  + *gender )  proportion paid  + (1-proportion paid )total q p g q p qβ β β β=  (10) 
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Table 4: Estimation of the final MNL model. 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
The betas in this formula are the same for everyone. The coefficient of 
price*proportion paid by others from the estimation of Table 4 is the βp3 (βp3 =-0.0023). 
The βp2 is the coefficient of price*proportion paid. The βg is the coefficient of 
price*proportion paid*gender. For instance, for men who receive no travel cost 
compensation the total marginal utility of price is equal to βp2.. The resulting group 
specific coefficient is used in the calculation of elasticities and WTP’s. On average the 
total marginal utility of price is -0.00288. This suggest that ignoring the heterogeneity 
caused by the compensation, as the estimation of Table 3 did, has no effect on the mean 
estimate of the marginal utility of price. However, ignoring the heterogeneity does cause 
the probabilities to be biased. When heterogeneous marginal utilities are ignored, the 
Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 
Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
price*proportion paid (generic) -0.0064*** -8.44 -0.0064*** -8.44   
price*proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0023
***
 -4.85 -0.0023*** -4.85   
price*proportion paid*gender (generic) 0.0043*** 4.01 0.0043*** 4.01  
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0085*** -3.72   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.29   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0118*** -6.33   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0098*** -4.63   
Max 5 days travel 
 
  -0.2578*** -2.75   
Control variables 
   
Inflexible travel moment    -0.1342*** -3.99   
Journey time in 15 min or less   Reference Group Reference Group 
minutes dummies: 16 to 30 min   0.1166 0.78 -0.7542*** -4.65 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1603 -0.97 -0.8073*** -4.49 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3540** -2.02 -0.7452*** -4.02 
 More than  90   -0.1733 -1.04 -0.9741*** -5.10 
Car in household    0.1916* 1.82 0.0473 0.41 
Frequency trip    0.0273 0.33 -0.0736 -0.77 
Gender dummy 
(1=women)    -0.0658 -0.67 -0.0918 -0.71 
Age dummies 18 or less 
  
  0.8275 1.21 
 19 to 29     1.1382* 1.87 
 30 to 39     1.2101** 1.99 
 40 to 49     0.8267 1.36 
 50 to 59     1.1639* 1.92 
 60 and older    Reference Group 
ASC   -0.7514*** -3.59 -3.0454*** -4.79 
Respondents   568        Choice cards per respondent   8        log-likelihood   -2815.6        Adjusted Rho2   0.5700 
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unobserved elements of the two card alternatives will be correlated, as they both contain 
the deviation from the mean marginal utility (because of the travel cost compensation) 
multiplied by the price. Thus controlling for travel cost compensation is especially 
important when doing forecasting or calculating elasticities. Furthermore, by ignoring 
cost compensation one ignores an important source of heterogeneity and this 
heterogeneity might also be of interest in itself. 
Table 5 shows the average WTP’s for the restrictions. A Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) is 
calculated by dividing the coefficient of a (restriction) attribute by the (group average) 
marginal utility of the price attribute. A WTP measures how much of a price increase 
would give the same utility as a one unit increase in the attribute, and thus what price 
decrease the average respondent requires to accept a one unit worsening in that attribute 
and being equally well off as before.  
The fully compensated are willing to spend much more for reductions in the 
restrictions than those who are not fully compensated. Women are willing to spend 
substantially more than men. Men will on average accept a €2.92 per month price 
increase and women €8.19, for a one minute decrease in the displacement time later for 
the outbound trip. A one-minute decrease in the displacement time earlier for the return 
trip gives men on average the same utility as a price increase of €1.85. The value for the 
displacement later for the return trip for women is €4.28. The maximum 5 days of travel 
by season card is valued on average as much as a price increase of €40.34 by men and 
€113.03 by women. This is equal to a displacement time earlier and later for the 
outbound trip of 30 and 14 minutes. 
Table 5: Willingness-to-Pay for reductions in the restrictions for the final MNL model. 
Variable Coeff. / average total combined 
marginal utility of price 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
For those who 
receive no cost 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier € 1.85 € 1.33 € 3.73 € 3.70 € 1.68 
Displacement time outbound trip 
later € 4.06 € 2.92 € 8.19 € 8.13 € 3.70 
Displacement time return trip earlier € 2.58 € 1.85 € 5.20 € 5.13 € 2.34 
Displacement time return trip later € 2.12 € 1.53 € 4.28 € 4.26 € 1.94 
Max 5 days travel € 56.06 € 40.34 € 113.03 € 112.09 € 74.26 
Table 6: Aggregate price elasticities for the final MNL model. 
 Unrestricted season card Restricted season card 
 Combined Men Women Combined Men Women 
For the whole group -0.132 -0.164 -0.088 -0.369 -0.427 -0.279 
For the fully compensated -0.091 -0.098 -0.082 -0.292 -0.304 -0.275 
For those who receive no travel cost 
compensation -0.216 -0.296 -0.058 -0.492 -0.613 -0.210 
 
The price elasticities of the unrestricted and restricted card are differentiated in Table 
6 by the “proportion paid” of the season card’s price and gender. The choice situation 
specific elasticities are calculated with (3). After the calculation of the micro elasticities, 
the elasticities are aggregated by calculating the choice probability weighted average. 
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The price elasticities are rather low (in absolute sense). Especially, the price 
elasticities for the unrestricted card are very small. The elasticities are in fact so low 
that it is suspicious. Women react more inelastically to price changes than men. 
Surprising is that the women who currently are fully compensated have a larger 
elasticity (in absolute sense) to total price than the women who pay the entire price 
themselves (as they receive no compensation). This is a peculiar result, as one would 
expect that the larger share a person has to pay, the more price-sensitive she is. 
The elasticities for the restricted card are larger in absolute sense than for the 
unrestricted card. This result is because the choice probabilities for the restricted card 
are much lower than for the unrestricted card, and ceteris paribus the higher the 
probability the smaller the absolute size of a MNL elasticity. This is also visible in the 
MNL elasticity formula (3). See also Figure 1 for the distribution of the choice 
frequencies. 
The responses of the respondent seem very price inelastic. The MNL estimations 
show that there is a substantial difference in the price sensitivity depending on what 
share a respondent pays of the card’s price. 
 
 
6. The nested logit estimation 
 
The nested logit estimation controls for the correlated unobserved utilities of the two 
season card alternatives. The two season card alternatives are put in the “buy a season 
card” nest and the third (no card) alternative sits alone in its degenerate “do not buy a 
card” nest. This nest structure is also depicted in the nest tree of Figure A2 in the 
appendix. Adding control variables in estimation proved more difficult with nested logit 
than with MNL. When the inflexible travel time variable or the journey length dummies 
are added, the estimation does not converge. Journey length in minutes and its squared 
form are added to the estimation, allowing at least some control for non-linear effects. 
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Table 7: The nested logit model. 
 Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
Price * proportion paid (generic) -0.0273*** -9.73 -0.0273*** -9.73   
Price * proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0089
***
 -6.59 -0.0089*** -6.59   
Price * proportion paid*gender dummy 
(generic) 0.0137
***
 3.78 0.0137*** 3.78   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0089*** -3.82   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0183*** -9.01   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0112*** -5.84   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0092*** -4.31   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2840*** -2.94   
Control variables 
   
Journey time in minutes   -0.0306*** -5.27 -0.0236*** -3.84 
(Journey time in minutes)^2   0.0002*** 4.82 0.0002*** 3.45 
Car in household   0.3086*** 2.84 0.0066 0.06 
Frequency trip   -0.1114 -1.29 -0.0856 -0.92 
Gender dummy (1=women)   0.0741 0.68 -0.1180 -1.02 
ASC   -0.6697*** -2.94 -1.9280*** -8.97 
       
Nest level scale parameters 
      
Nest Coeff. t-statistic (against H0:    scale parameter =1) 
Buy a season card 0.1710*** 29.06 
Do not buy a season card 1.0000 Fixed normalised parameter 
Respondents  568      Choice cards per respondent  8      log-likelihood  -2799.2      Adjusted Rho2   0.5649 
Note: ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
The scale parameters on the alternative level and for the degenerate do not buy a 
season card nest are normalized to one. The scale parameter for the “buy a season card” 
nest is very low with 0.17 and is significantly different from one and zero. This shows 
that the IID assumption of MNL is violated. Following Hensher, Rose and Greene 
(2005), the correlation between the utility functions of two alternatives is given by 
corr(Vj-Vi)=1-(λl)2, where the λl is the nest level scale parameter. The correlation of the 
utility functions of the two season card alternatives is therefore 1-(0.17)2=0.97. This is a 
very high correlation. Furthermore, the log-likelihood of the nested logit estimation is 
also much higher than of the final MNL model. The nested structure is clearly an 
improvement to the MNL estimation. 
All the coefficients of the attributes are of the expected sign, and significant at the one 
percent level. The control variables have a substantial effect in the estimation. The 
utilities of owning a restricted card and the no card alternative again decrease with 
journey length. The longer the most frequent trip takes, the less the decreasing effect of 
an extra minute is. This is shown by the small though significant positive coefficient of 
the squared version (the net effect remains negative though in the sample). The longer 
the journey length of the most frequent trip, the more likely it is that the respondent 
prefers the unrestricted card. This makes sense, since it is more difficult to avoid a 
certain travel window when the trip takes longer. Furthermore, for the longer trips fewer 
alternative modes are available. Thus the longer the most frequent trip the less attractive 
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the no card alternative. The car dummy has a positive effect on the utility of the 
restricted card, though it has no effect on the third no card alternative. 
Persons who receive no cost compensation are again substantially more price 
sensitive. The total price coefficient is calculated by the same equation (10) as with 
MNL and is on average -0.0118. This is more than four times the value from the final 
MNL model, whereas the coefficients of the restriction are almost exactly the same. 
Table 8: WTP’s for the nested logit model. 
Variable Coeff. / average total combined 
marginal utility of price 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
 
For those who 
receive no cost 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier € 0.76 € 0.68 € 0.92 € 1.01 € 0.39 
Displacement time outbound trip 
later € 1.56 € 1.39 € 1.90 € 2.08 € 0.80 
Displacement time return trip earlier € 0.94 € 0.84 € 1.15 € 1.28 € 0.49 
Displacement time return trip later € 0.79 € 0.70 € 0.95 € 1.05 € 0.40 
Max 5 days travel € 24.22 € 21.56 € 29.38 € 32.36 € 12.37 
 
Table 8 depicts the WTP’s for the nested logit estimation. The same pattern as with 
MNL emerges for the valuations of the displacement time attributes. Respondent are on 
average willing to pay most for reductions in the displacement time later for the 
outbound trip. Women again have on average substantially higher WTP’s. The WTP’s 
are much lower with nested logit than with MNL, because the price coefficients are 
much more negative with nested logit. The coefficients for the restrictions are almost 
exactly the same with nested logit as with MNL. Thus, if the correlation between the 
utilities of two card alternatives is ignored, this results in an overestimation of the 
WTP’s for our data. Note that the coefficients of the displacement time variable are very 
similar between nested logit and MNL. This indicates that the largest problem of the 
correlated unobserved elements was for the price variables. 
Respondents are willing to suffer 32 and 15 minutes of extra displacement time later 
and earlier for the outbound trip for a lifting of the travel frequency restriction. Men are 
willing to accept a price increase of €21.56 and women of €29.38. 
The choice situation specific alternative choice probabilities elasticities of Table 9 are 
calculated with (4), after which they are aggregated by calculating the choice 
probability weighted average. The elasticities are with nested logit considerably higher 
than with MNL. Women show elastic responses to price changes in the restricted card. 
Reassuring is that we no longer see the strange result that women who are fully 
compensated are more sensitive to price changes than women that receive no 
compensation, as was found in the MNL estimation. The result is now that the larger 
share a women pays of the price, the more price sensitive she is. 
The responses to price changes of the unrestricted card are again much more inelastic 
than for the restricted season card. The price elasticities are larger because the relative 
size of the price coefficient with nested logit is bigger in absolute sense than with MNL. 
Again there is a large difference in the elasticities for the fully compensated and not 
compensated, hence the response to price changes are very different for the two groups. 
This shows again that in doing forecasting it is important to control for travel cost 
compensation, as otherwise the predicted changes in the probabilities will be incorrect. 
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Table 9: Aggregate price elasticities for the nested logit estimation.  
Group Unrestricted season card Restricted season card 
 Combined Men Women Combined Men Women 
For the whole group -0.355 -0.428 -0.254 -1.525 -1.724 -1.206 
For the fully compensated -0.215 -0.230 -0.196 -1.118 -1.182 -1.036 
For those who receive no travel cost 
compensation -0.686 -0.853 -0.352 -2.154 -2.439 -1.384 
 
The nested logit section showed that the unobserved utilities of the two season card 
alternatives are correlated. However, the calculation of the choice probabilities by MNL 
uses the assumption that these unobserved elements are uncorrelated. The WTP’s 
calculated from the nested logit output are substantially smaller and the price elasticities 
are higher. 
 
 
7. Mixed logit estimation 
 
Nested logit only relaxes the IID assumption of the MNL to some extent and it can 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity in the marginal utilities. Mixed logit, allows 
for more freedom. It seems likely that the price coefficients differ over the respondents 
for unobserved reasons. Bhat (1998) notes that not controlling for (unobserved) 
response heterogeneity, can lead to biased estimates of the elasticities and WTP’s.  
Furthermore, mixed logit allows us to take into account that the experiment has eight 
choice situations per respondent. MNL and nested logit assume that the unobserved 
elements of an alternative over the choice situations for the same person are 
uncorrelated and therefore that the unobserved elements are unrelated for the same 
person from one choice situation to the next. This seems an implausible assumption. As 
Train (2003) states, ignoring the repeated choices causes the unobserved element to be 
correlated over choice situations, and this violates the IID assumption.  
This misrepresentation of the structure of the unobserved elements (by ignoring the 
repeated choices) can cause the standard errors of the coefficients to be incorrect. For 
instance, because forcing a structure that assumes that the (random element of) a 
marginal utility are different for an individual from one choice situation to the next 
produces extra noise in the estimation.  However, this should not affect the mean 
parameter estimates. In an estimation not tabulated in this paper we re-estimated our 
mixed logit model while ignoring that the data is repeated choice; hence, giving the 
same individual different draws for different choice situations. The resulting 
coefficients were indeed more or less the same. However, the standard errors were 
different and on the whole larger. Furthermore, the log-likelihood for this second mixed 
logit estimation was almost 200 lower than for the panel mixed logit, while having the 
same number of coefficients. The panel version of mixed logit seems therefore more 
efficient, in that the standard errors are smaller.  
 With mixed logit it is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
marginal utilities (i.e. response heterogeneity). By making the ASC of the no card 
alternative random, it is possible to control for unobserved differences in the utility of 
owning a season card (i.e. preference heterogeneity), as the ASC_3 is defined as the 
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negative of this utility. Train (2003) notes that by giving a constant of one or more 
alternatives a random element it is possible to control for a nest structure. In this case, 
we can thus control for the nest structure of the two card alternatives by giving the ASC 
of the third (no card) alternative a random element.  
In a footnote Revelt and Train (1998) note that there is a difference in what type of 
correlation pattern nested logit and panel mixed logit control for. Nested logit assumes 
that the correlated unobserved elements for a person over the choice situations are 
independent. Conversely, the panel mixed logit assumes that these correlated elements 
(i.e. the random element of ASC_3) are the same in all choice situations of an 
individual. The ASC_3 measures the minus of the utility of owning a card, which 
should at least be very similar, if not precisely the same, over the eight choice situations 
per person. Hence, the panel mixed logit representation of the correlation pattern seems 
the best choice for this experiment. Note that the random ASC causes the model to be 
heteroscedastic in the unobserved effects over the respondents, but not over the choice 
situations faced by an individual. 
The marginal utilities are for lognormal and triangle distributions given by 
 
- lognormal; 
_
exp( ) *  exp( * ) *  exp( ),Tkq k k sd kq k qN v zβ β β= ±  (11) 
- triangle;     
_
* .
T
kq k k sd kq k qT v zβ β β= + +  (12) 
 
Here Nkq is a normally distributed (quasi-)random variable with a zero mean and a 
standard deviation of one. It has the same value for individual q in all choice situations. 
The Tkq is a (quasi-)random variable with a triangle distribution, with -1≤Tkq≤1 and a 
zero mean. The zq contains the interaction variables and vector νk their effects on the 
marginal utility of k. The sign before the exponential in equation (11) is determined by 
the predetermined sign of the marginal utility. If the random parameter of an attribute 
must be negative, the outcome of (11) is multiplied by minus one. For our final mixed 
logit we used 2500 Halton draws and unconditional parameters. We used a panel 
version of mixed logit; hence, the 2500 were the same for individual q over the eight 
choice situations. 
The presentation of the mixed logit needs some explanation. The “Fixed parts of the 
random parameters” section in Table 10 depicts the fixed parts of the marginal utilities. 
The following section shows the coefficients for the effect of the random elements 
(βk_sd). The “Observed heterogeneity in marginal utility of price” gives the coefficients 
(νk) for the interacted variables. The estimation of Table 10 tests whether the coefficient 
of price and the ASC_3 differ for observed and unobserved reasons. 
The random element of the marginal utility of price has a lognormal distribution. 
Before the estimation, the price attribute was multiplied by minus one. The random 
element of ASC_3 has a triangular distribution. Interpreting the coefficients of the 
lognormal distributed random parameters is difficult, as the coefficients are inside an 
exponentional. An easy way to interpret the coefficients of the background variables 
(multiplied by the background variable) for log-normally distributed marginal utilities is 
that they scale the (absolute) size of the marginal utilities. Hence, their effect is not 
subtracted from the marginal utility, as is usually done for the effect of background 
variables with the other types of distribution shapes of the random element. A positive 
(negative) coefficient for the observed heterogeneity means that the larger the 
background variable the larger (smaller) the absolute size of the marginal utility. 
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Table 10: Random effects of price of the season card and owning a season card. 
   
Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Fixed parts of the random parameters  
     
Price -6.1077# -38.7 -6.1077# -38.7   
ASC_3     -3.3168*** -6.25 
Parameters of the random elements    
   
Price  (lognormal) 1.1681*** 12.8 1.1681*** 12.8   
ASC_3  (triangular)     9.1772*** 12.2 
Observed heterogeneity 
in marginal utility of price       
Proportion paid*price 0.9648*** 9.95 0.9648*** 9.95   
Gender (female=1) *Price -0.4455*** -4.00 -0.4455*** -4.00   
Car dummy*Price 1.4802*** 16.69 1.4802*** 16.69   
Attributes 
      
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0087*** 4.12   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0194*** 9.24   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0107*** 5.67   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0113*** 5.60   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2950*** 3.36   
Control variables 
      
Journey length in minutes   -0.0297*** -6.66 -0.1127*** -10.1 
(Journey length in minutes)^2   0.0002*** 6.26 0.0008*** 8.60 
Car in household   -0.1727* -1.83 -2.9765*** -9.88 
Frequency trip   0.1042 1.10 -0.5923*** -3.97 
Gender dummy (female=1)   -0.1267 -1.59 1.2903*** 4.33 
ASC   -0.3410* -1.90   
Respondents  568     Choice cards per respondent  8     log-likelihood  -2536.1     Adjusted Rho2  0.5132 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
# As the only reasonable H0 of a zero fixed part of this marginal utility means that this coefficient should 
be -∞ ( as Exp(-∞)=0), there is no (valid) t-statistic (Bhat, 1998). The reported t-statistic is against zero 
and only shows that the standard error is much smaller than the coefficient. 
 
The log-likelihood of the mixed logit is much lower than the one of the nested logit 
and a likelihood ratio test reject the nested logit in favour of the mixed logit at the one 
percent level. To identify observable differences in price sensitivity, the price variable 
is interacted with the proportion paid, gender and car dummies. The coefficients of 
these interactions are all significant at the one percent level. The fact that the coefficient 
of price interacted with proportion paid is positive makes clear that the larger the 
proportion of the price a respondent currently pays, the more price sensitive she is. 
Women are again less price sensitive, as for women the marginal utility is multiplied by 
exp(-0.45). Interesting is that car ownership of the respondent’s household now does 
have a significant effect on the marginal utility of the price attribute. This compares 
with the previous estimations which found no such effect. Other control variables had 
no differentiating effect on the marginal utility of price or the restrictions. 
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The ASC_3 and price variable have highly significant coefficients the random 
elements. This shows that both differ over the respondents for unobserved reasons. The 
ASC_3 is on average very negative. This indicates that on average there is a strong 
preference for owning a season card. The coefficient of the random element of the 
ASC_3 is in absolute terms almost three times the size of the fixed part. This ASC is 
meant to measure the minus of the utility of owning a season card. This shows that the 
spread in this unobserved utility is substantial.  
The coefficients of the restriction attributes are, as expected, negative and highly 
significant. The coefficients of the restrictions are roughly the same as in the MNL en 
nested logit estimation. A noticeable difference is that the ordering of relative sizes is 
slightly different. Now the coefficient for Displacement time return trip later is slightly 
larger than the one of Displacement time return trip earlier, whereas before it was the 
other way around. None of the restriction attributes are found to have random 
components. This mirrors the finding of the MNL estimations, where the coefficients of 
the restrictions did not differ for observed reasons. 
The journey length variable and its squared form have very significant effects on the 
utilities of the restricted card and no card alternatives. The longer the journey length is, 
the lower the utilities of the second and third alternatives. The minimum of the 
quadratic journey length effect function lies for the unrestricted card around 149 
minutes and for no card alternative around 141 minutes. It should be noted that the 
maximum journey length in the sample is 150 minutes and that only two respondents 
had a value of more than 140 minutes. It seems hence seems safe to state that the longer 
the journey length, the more likely one is to choose the unrestricted card and that the 
effect of extra journey length decreases, the longer the trip was to start with. The car 
dummy has negative effects on the utilities of the second and third alternatives. The 
frequency of rail travel and gender variables now have, different from the previous 
estimations, significant effects on the utility of the no card alternative. The more often a 
respondent travels by rail, the less likely she is to stop owning a card. 
Interpreting the coefficients from logit estimation, and especially a mixed logit with 
lognormal coefficients, is difficult. The results are best interpreted by calculating 
elasticities and Willingness-to-Pay. The choice situation specific elasticities are 
determined by (8). This equation has, as was stated before, two parts that are in open-
form integrals (the first for the derivative of the probability to price and the second for 
the choice probability itself) (Train, 2003). Therefore, the elasticities are approximated 
by a second simulation using 100 Halton draws. With the draws, expected values for 
each choice situation are calculated for the derivative and the choice probability, and 
these are used to calculate the simulated choice situation specific elasticities. 
As is visible in (8) the derivative depends on the realisation of the (random elements 
of the) marginal utility of price and the ASC of the no card alternative. For price the 
marginal utility is given by a rewritten version of (11), which is given in (13). Here Npq 
is a quasi-random variable, the βp the fixed part of the marginal utility, βp_sd the 
coefficient of the random element and the ν’s give the coefficients of the interactions.  
 
*exp( * * *  ).
 _
) * exp( ) * (N proportionpaid gender car dummyprice q p pq prop q g q car qp sd Expβ β β ν ν ν+= − +  (13) 
 
Table A.3 in the appendix gives the descriptive statistics for the expected values of 
the marginal utilities, based on the second simulation. The average marginal utility of 
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price from (13) is -0.0167, which is somewhat larger than with nested logit. Conversely, 
the coefficients of the restrictions are of comparable sizes in the two estimations. 
The micro elasticities, as simulated by (8), were aggregated by calculating the choice 
probability average3. Tables 11 and 12 depict the aggregate elasticities for the 
unrestricted and restricted card. The elasticities are differentiated by proportion paid by 
the respondent, car ownership of the households of the respondents and gender. 
Table 11: Aggregate elasticities for the unrestricted season card.  
Table 12: Aggregate elasticities for the restricted season card.  
Group Average A car  in the household No car in the household 
 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
Both 
genders Men Women 
All respondents -1.624 -1.941 -2.086 -1.651 -0.725 -0.826 -0.541 
For the fully compensated -1.476 -1.775 -1.921 -1.496 -0.529 -0.647 -0.358 
For those who receive no 
travel cost compensation -1.861 -2.187 -2.282 -1.949 -1.033 -1.053 -0.965 
 
For the restricted card alternative, the responses are highly elastic to the price 
attribute. Conversely, the demand for the unrestricted card is on the whole price 
inelastic. The restricted card must offer a large price saving for it to be competitive. 
Car availability has a large effect on the price sensitivities. Respondents with one or 
more cars in the household react elastically to price changes, whereas the respondents 
without a car react very inelastically. This is logical as in the Netherlands for inter-city 
transport the car is the main alternative to the train. The fully compensated are again far 
less price sensitive than the respondents who receive no cost compensation. 
The elasticities are somewhat larger than those of the nested logit model and much 
larger than those of the MNL. This suggests that ignoring the heterogeneity in the price 
sensitivity and the correlation between the unobserved elements causes an 
underestimation of the average price sensitivity. This is a comparable result to the 
findings of Bhat (1998), who found for his data that the elasticities with mixed logit are 
higher than with MNL.  
The elasticities found here are of course not comparable to those found in other 
situations, as currently the restricted season card does not exist. For the purpose of 
comparison we therefore deleted the second restricted card alternative in a second 
calculation of the elasticities, using the coefficients of the same MNL, nested logit and 
                                                 
3
 The second simulation was performed in Gauss 6.0 and the Halton draws were based on the primes 2 
and 3. This simulation by 100 draws was remarkably stable. When we ran the same program using the 
primes 3 & 2, 5 & 7, 5 & 13, 7 & 11 and 11 & 13 the resulting (differentiated) aggregates only differed 
from each other by a few thousands.  
Group Average A car  in the household No car in the household 
  
Both 
genders Men Women 
Both 
genders Men Women 
All respondents -0.431 -0.544 -0.668 -0.377 -0.173 -0.223 -0.108 
For the fully compensated -0.173 -0.437 -0.546 -0.299 -0.113 -0.152 -0.069 
For those who receive no 
travel cost compensation -0.544 -0.713 -0.796 -0.550 -0.335 -0.359 -0.271 
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mixed logit estimations. Following, this we re-calculated the aggregate price elasticities 
for the (unrestricted) season card. The responses in the SP study had a very strong 
nested structure, because the restricted card is so similar in unobserved characteristic to 
the unrestricted card. Consequently, the probability from the deleted alternative is not 
shared proportionally over the two remaining alternatives, but goes predominantly to the 
first season card alternative. Hence, as is also visible in Table 13, the (absolute) price 
elasticities are now much smaller. The aggregate elasticity (in the average column) in 
Table 11 is 7.4 times the size of same elasticity in Table 13. 
 The demand is even almost perfectly inelastic. This result might seem surprising. 
However, the result is rather plausible observing that the owners of the season card 
predominantly are commuters and business travellers. Furthermore, a very large share 
of the respondents is fully compensated and of course travel cost compensation also 
lowers the price sensitivity. The table, hence, shows that the demand for season cards is 
actually very inelastic, even though the alternative choice probability elasticities are 
much larger in absolute sense. Note though that even these elasticities are only 
representative for the current cardholders and not for the whole population of potential 
cardholders. Since, the used experiment only included current cardholders.  
This table also clearly shows that the IID assumption is violated. The MNL elasticities 
are now after the deletion higher than the nested logit elasticities, whereas, before they 
were much smaller. With MNL by assumption the relative size of the probabilities of 
the two remaining alternatives stays the same, as Pcard / Pno card = exp(Vcard – Vno card). 
Consequently, the probability of the deleted restricted card alternative is distributed 
proportionally over the two remaining alternatives. In really the fast majority probability 
goes to the unrestricted season card, because of the strong nested structure. Hence, 
because of the IID assumption, the increase in the probability of the unrestricted card 
following the deletion with MNL is much lower than with nested logit. This in turn 
causes the recalculated price elasticities from MNL to be larger than the recalculated 
nested and mixed logit elasticities. 
Table 13: Aggregated elasticities for the unrestricted card with the restricted card alternative deleted 
 MNL Nested Logit Mixed logit 
All respondents -0.0723 -0.0517 -0.0585 
For the fully compensated -0.0652 -0.0473 -0.0475 
For those who receive no travel cost compensation -0.1124 -0.0620 -0.0817 
 
Table 14 depicts the average WTP’s. The WTP were simulated by the same draws as 
the elasticities4. The average WTP‘s for the five restrictions are calculated by dividing 
the relevant coefficient by the (expected) marginal utility of price for each individual, 
and then calculating the average. The WTP’s for the restrictions have the same pattern 
of relative sizes as with the nested logit and MNL, except that now the WTP’s for the 
Displacement time return trip earlier are slightly smaller than those of the Displacement 
time return trip earlier. To take away the 5 day per week maximum of travel days the 
respondents are on average willing to spend more than 32 euros. This has the same 
value for the average respondent as an increase in the displacement time earlier and later 
for the outbound trip of 34 and 15 minutes. The WTP’s calculated from this mixed logit 
                                                 
4
 Similar to the simulation of the elasticities, the simulated WTP’s were very stable in regard to the choice of primes on which the 
Halton draws are based, with only differences of a few thousands of a Euro of the average values over the different sets of draws. 
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are smaller than those from MNL. They are, however, larger than those of the nested 
logit, even though the average marginal utility of price is higher with mixed logit and 
the coefficients of the restrictions from the two estimations almost exactly the same. 
This is caused by the heterogeneity in the marginal utility from the mixed logit. There 
are some cases with simulated marginal utilities that are very close to zero, and this has 
an increasing effect on the average WTP. 
Table 14: WTP’s for the travel restrictions for the mixed logit estimation.  
Variable Average 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
For those who 
receive no 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip earlier € 0.95 € 0.74 € 1.25 € 0.40 € 1.09 
Displacement time outbound trip later  € 2.13 € 1.65 € 2.80 € 0.90 € 2.44 
Displacement time return trip earlier  € 1.17 € 0.91 € 1.54 € 0.49 € 1.34 
Displacement time return trip later  € 1.24 € 0.96 € 1.63 € 0.52 € 1.42 
Max 5 days travel € 32.31 € 25.16 € 42.53 € 13.63 € 37.03 
 
Mixed logit can control for unobserved heterogeneity, whereas nested logit and MNL 
can not allow for this. The marginal utility of the price of the season card differs over 
the respondents for unobserved reasons and the ASC_3 has a random element to control 
for unobserved heterogeneous utility of owning a season card. The price elasticities 
from mixed logit are much larger than from MNL. This seems a plausible finding, as the 
elasticities from MNL were surprisingly small. The elasticities found by mixed logit are 
also larger (in absolute sense) than those from nested logit. This suggests that ignoring 
the response heterogeneity may cause biased estimations of the price elasticities. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies a Stated Preference experiment conducted among current Dutch 
railways season cardholders. The paper uses multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit and 
mixed logit to analyse the responses of 568 cardholders to eight choice cards. The 
respondents chose between (1) an unrestricted season card, (2) a cheaper season card 
with peak travel and travel frequency restrictions and (3) the no card alternative. 
The analysis showed that the assumptions behind the MNL method are violated by the 
structure of the experiment. The two card alternatives are perceived as very similar by 
the respondents and their unobserved utilities are highly correlated, while the alternative 
no card is rather different. The respondents show heterogeneous responses to price of 
the season card: different persons have very different marginal utilities for price. The 
mixed logit specification appears to provide the most satisfactory results, as it controls 
for the unobserved response heterogeneity, the fact that the SP experiment had repeated 
choices and the correlated unobserved elements. 
There are large differences between the price elasticities of the restricted and 
unrestricted card. The demand for the restricted season card is very price elastic, while 
the (absolute) price elasticity for the unrestricted card is generally low. The elasticities 
for the price obtained with the MNL and nested logit are smaller in absolute sense than 
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those obtained with mixed logit. The estimated Willingness-to-Pay for the reductions in 
the restrictions are much lower MNL than with mixed logit. The price elasticities for 
unrestricted card when we recalculated them, after deleting the restricted card 
alternative, are very close to zero. This suggests that the demand for season cards (in the 
current situation with only one type of season card available) is very price inelastic. 
Our findings on the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the performance of MNL 
are comparable to those of Bhat (1998; 2000a) and in contradiction to the theoretical 
paper of Horowitz (1980). An interesting question for further research is under what 
circumstances the heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of MNL for the elasticities 
and relative values of the coefficients (i.e. WTP’s). 
The proportion that respondents pay of the price of the season card has, as expected, a 
large influence on their price sensitivities. Respondents who pay nothing or a small 
share themselves of the price have much lower (absolute) price elasticities. This is 
obvious, but important, because a very large share of (Dutch) travellers get their travel 
costs entirely of partly compensated. 
It is important to control for this cause of heterogeneity in the marginal utility of price 
when doing forecasting or calculate elasticities. Without this control the choice 
probabilities might be incorrect (as it is a form of non-IID unobserved elements), and 
thus the elasticities and forecasts will be inaccurate. The best control seems interacting a 
background variable on the travel cost compensation with the price, as the used survey 
enabled us to do. However, if there is no data on the travel cost compensation, it is of 
course also possible to include this heterogeneity in the unobserved heterogeneity of the 
marginal utility with a mixed logit estimation. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A.1: Translated example of a season card SP choice card. 
Note:  The original choice cards were in Dutch, this version was created by the authors. The figure is 
based on Steer Davies Gleave (2006b, pp 7, fig. 3.1). 
Table A.1: Estimation with control for who pays the season card. 
 Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
Price * proportion paid (generic) -0.0042*** -6.82 -0.0042*** -6.82   
Price * proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0018
***
 -3.62 -0.0018*** -3.62   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0085*** -3.71   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.31   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0119*** -6.35   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0097*** -4.60   
Max 5 days travel 
 
  -0.2572*** -2.75   
Control variables 
      
Inflexible travel moment   -0.1323*** -3.94   
Journey time in minutes 
dummies: 15 min or less   0.1271 0.85 -0.7136
***
 -4.44 
 16 to 30 min   -0.1342 -0.82 -0.7435*** -4.19 
 31 to 45 min   -0.3339* -1.91 -0.6394*** -3.46 
 40 to 90 
  -0.1273 -0.77 -0.7721*** -4.09 
 More than  90 
   0.1876*  1.78 -0.0019 -0.02 
Car in household  
   0.0162  0.20 -0.1118 -1.21 
Frequency trip  
   0.1271  0.85 -0.7136*** -4.44 
ASC  
  -0.7564*** -3.71 -1.8620*** -9.32 
Respondents  568     Choice cards per respondent  8     log-likelihood  -2833.2     Adjusted Rho2  0.5721 
Note: ***, **, and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table A.2: Final MNL model without gender effects. 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Figure A.2: The nest tree of the alternatives 
   Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
   Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. Coeff. t-statistic Coeff 
Attributes 
      
price*proportion paid (generic) 
-0.0043*** -7.13 -0.0043*** 7.13   
price*proportion paid by others (generic) 
-0.0017*** -3.60 -0.0017*** 3.60   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier 
  -0.0085*** -3.71   
Displacement time outbound trip later 
  -0.0187*** -9.29   
Displacement time return trip earlier 
  -0.0118*** -6.33   
Displacement time return trip later 
  -0.0098*** -4.63   
Max 5 days travel 
  -0.2573*** -2.75   
Control variables 
      
Inflexible travel moment 
   -0.1335*** -3.98   
15 min or less   Reference group Reference group Journey time in minutes 
dummies: 16 to 30 min    0.1288 0.86 -0.7207 -4.46 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1324 -0.81 -0.7427 -4.16 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3309* -1.89 -0.6577 -3.54 
 More than  90   -0.1254 -0.76 -0.7975 -4.23 
Car in household 
    0.1881* 1.79  0.0079 0.07 
Frequency trip 
    0.0159 0.20 -0.1175 -1.25 
Age dummies 18 or less      0.6071 0.89 
 19 to 29      0.9765 1.61 
 30 to 39      1.0895* 1.81 
 40 tp 49      0.7803 1.29 
 50 to 59      1.1483* 1.91 
 60 and older     Reference group 
ASC 
   -0.7540*** -3.69 -2.8178*** -4.47 
Respondents  568      Choice cards per respondent  8      log-likelihood  -2827.1      Adjusted Rho2  0.5721 
Buy a season card Do not buy a season card 
No season card Restricted season card Unrestricted season card 
Nests: 
Alternatives 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 40 (2008): 4-32 
 32 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of the expected mixed logit marginal utilities from Table 10. 
Coefficient Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total marginal utility of price  -0.0166 0.0173 -0.0487 -0.0021 
ASC_3 of the third alternative -3.3205 0.5950 -5.4091 -1.2363 
ASC_3 plus the effect of the control 
variables -8.5267 1.9642 -12.4807 -2.5245 
 
